Learning how to deal with the devil

`China's position seems to be hardening as it has just recently expanded its efforts to contain Taiwan in the international community, to coercing foreign companies to cooperate in isolating Taiwan's private sector economy. So far, this very significant step has received little criticism from abroad. Is that a boycott?.'

Over the past month, the media reported two aspects of Taiwan's political atmosphere that were not evident in the last election, but will become a permanent feature in the future: the changes in cross-strait economic policy and the publicizing of anti-administration liaisons with the China by opposition politicians. Both constitute a more public "China lobby" in Taiwan's poli-tics. The influence this will have on the electorate is still unclear, but there is also a possible influence on US policy toward Taiwan worth thinking about.

Present US policy on the cross-strait issue is often simplified to mean no use of force, no unilateral change by either side in Taiwan's political status and that any change in this status must have the acquiescence of the people on Taiwan.

The US tends to place its policy attention on avoiding traditional flashpoints: use of force by China; or declaration of independence by Taiwan. However, there are other situations mentioned in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) ? no blockade, no boycotts or embargoes; ? or resisting any resort to the use of force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic system, of the people of Taiwan. Some of these situations receive much less attention. Maybe that will change.

The trend that seems now to be taking place in Taiwan fall into some of the policy scenarios suggested in the TRA. The DPP's victory in the last presidential election was seen as a sign of democratic maturity. It also brought a greater polarization of the debate on national identity. This is coming about not only as a result of policies being pursued by the administration, but apparently also by members of the opposition (and some of the media) in encouraging China's involvement in Taiwan's politics.

The surprise in the recent revelation of this is that it was a surprise, since it has been common knowledge for a considerable time. The rather muted reaction it got almost assures that public lobbying on the cross-strait relationship in favor of closer ties with China will be politically cost-free. Already the meaning of what has always been considered the overwhelming majority of voters' preference on this subject, the status quo, has become less clear.

On the national identity issue, people that espouse more immediate unification are relatively few, and even their closest recognized party -- the New Party -- though more strongly supporting unification, does not call for it now.

The party making the strongest stand on the status quo for now but unification eventually has traditionally been the KMT. It's strength in the short-term may continue to be significant, but its internal divisions make its future influence less clear. Its ability to maintain cohesion will be tested despite its large reservoir of funds.

The DPP maintains an acceptance of the status quo for now, with an increasingly less clear objective for the future, but this position remains controversial within the party.

The People First Party's position on national identity is more vague than the KMT.

The position of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) on the national identity issue is more assertive than the DPP and it remains opposed to some of the proposed economic policy changes.

Though its connection with former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) makes it a credible player in the coming election, to what degree the TSU will effect the outcome and the strength it will have in the Legislative Yuan is still too early to tell.

Differences in the parties over economic issues are far less clear. A consensus seems to have been reached on a broader opening to greater integration with China's economy, but implementation will be just as difficult to make, and the behavior of China on the issue remains critical. There has been little reaction from China even after the policy recommendations of the Economic Advisory Devel-opment Council.

In fact, China's position seems to be hardening as it has just recently expanded its efforts to contain Taiwan in the international community, to coercing foreign companies to cooperate in isolating Taiwan's private sector economy. So far, this very significant step has received little criticism from abroad. Is that a boycott?

The importance of the different party objectives regarding economic integration, national identity and other issues, and the likelihood that no party will attain a majority in the forthcoming Legislative Yuan elections could result in a highly fractious government and force some form of coalition. Whatever arrangements that might be made or rejected with China under these conditions, will seldom be made without considerable controversy. The assent of the people, a condition the US supports for any change in Taiwan's political status, will be more difficult to ascertain.

Under these circumstances, US policy toward Taiwan will have to consider a larger number of scenarios, not just on security matters but on some domestic political conditions that democracy has brought to Taiwan.

The scenario that the US may be called upon to involve itself in an invasion of Taiwan by China is fast disappearing, but already is being replaced by missile defense and information warfare options.

Another one is a blockade or some other form of coercion by China. The possibility is mentioned in the TRA and is now more possible with missile deployment and closer economic integration.

A third scenario could be economic pressure or united front activities by China that jeopardize the economy and/or create domestic turmoil in Taiwan. Pressures from the rapidly growing Taiwanese business community with interests in China, the political pressures generated by the differences over cross-strait relations, and expanded efforts to isolate Taiwan economically, are already evident. At some point those opposed to this trend could take to the streets. What might be the US reaction?

Yet another scenario is that a more confrontational position is taken by the Taiwan government in response to these trends. Creeping coercion could lead the president to launch high profile challenges much as happened in the recent past.

And finally, an agreement might be reached by the leaders of the two sides, perhaps under pressure from the US, but rejected by the people of Taiwan in polls or a referendum. This kind of premature action could easily destabilize Taiwan.

There are doubtless other scenarios that can be conjured up for policy makers. But a broad policy needed to cover today's contingencies might have to go beyond the security dimension.

Cross-strait political activities that lead to unwanted results for the people on Taiwan, and to which the US does not respond, could result in the same harm to its larger interests in East Asia as a military action.

Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.